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Defendant/Appellee W. Charles Barney, ("Mr. Barney") pursuant 
to Rule 24(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, hereby 
submits the following brief in response to Plaintiff/Appellant, 
Jonathan Jones ("Mr. Jones"). 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This case is before the Utah Court of Appeals under its 
authority granted by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-2 (h) . This is an 
appeal from a final Order granting Summary Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Was the doctrine of Assumption of risk properly applied 
where Mr. Jones was a participant in an amateur sporting event, and 
was injured in a foreseeable accident, contemplated by the rules of 
the sport? 
2. Can Mr. Jones appeal on the issue of intentional conduct 
when Mr. Jones's "Second Cause of Action for Intentional Conduct" 
against Mr. Barney was dismissed voluntarily on Mr. Jones's own 
motion prior to Summary Judgment? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This case was brought as an action for negligent, reckless or 
intentional conduct. Mr. Jones moved to dismiss his own claim for 
intentional conduct on the 9th day of March, 1992. See Exhibit "A". 
Mr. Barney filed his Motion for Summary Judgment on the 4th day of 
June, 1992, after the claim of intentional conduct had been 
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withdrawn. See Exhibit "B". Therefore, only the negligence and 
recklessness claims were considered on Summary judgment. On 
appeal, this court need only consider whether the doctrine of 
Assumption of Risk applies to negligent or reckless conduct, and 
need not consider how it might apply to intentional torts. 
Further, this court need only consider the application of the 
doctrine of assumption of risk to cases where the injured party is 
a voluntary participant in an activity, such as an athletic 
competition, which involves a known, obvious risk. 
Course of Proceedings. 
After discovery, Mr. Jones moved to dismiss his claim for 
intentional conduct. Then, Mr. Barney moved for summary judgment 
of the remaining issues in the case. No oral argument was heard, 
because neither party requested an oral hearing. 
Statement of Undisputed Facts. 
1. Mr. Jones was the first batter in an amateur L.D.S. 
softball game. 
2. Mr. Jones hit a "grounder" towards the pitcher's mound. 
3. Mr. Barney expected the pitcher to field the ball, but 
when the ball rolled between the pitcher's legs, he fielded it 
barehanded, and threw it in the direction of first base, attempting 
to get an "out." 
4. Mr. Barney was somewhere between first and second base, 
and was struck in the head by the ball. 
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5. Mr. Barney cannot confirm or deny the extent of Mr. 
Jones's injuries, if any. However, since the decision of the trial 
court rests not on a decision of no damages, but on a decision of 
no liability, this is not material to this appeal. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Mr. Barney was not negligent, because everything that occurred 
can reasonably be expected when an actor voluntarily participates 
in a softball game. Mr. Jones asserted in discovery that he is an 
experienced softball player, and has participated in numerous 
games. Mr. Jones should not be able to recover for injuries 
sustained within the normal course of the game. 
The doctrine of assumption of risk is a shorthand way of 
stating the doctrine of license, and of comparative negligence. 
Participating in a competitive, athletic event contains within it 
an implicit license to the types of conduct that are reasonably 
foreseen by the sport. Therefore, while conduct within the safety 
rules of the game, e.g., throwing the softball to first, cannot be 
a tort, while conduct outside the rules, e.g., tackling someone to 
prevent their taking a base, is not expected by the participants, 
and should be actionable. Here, Mr. Jones had to know that when 
you are playing softball, it is possible to be struck by the ball. 
His participation is an acknowledgement that he has assumed the 
risk of contact with the ball. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I: MR, JONES'S CLAIM IS BARRED 
BY THE DOCTRINE OF ASSUMPTION OF RISK. 
Mr, Jones, in his brief, fails to distinguish between the 
concepts of assumption of risk and comparative negligence. Here, 
in addition to any comparative negligence that may or may not have 
been present on the part of the Mr. Jones, he knowingly and 
voluntarily assumed the risks involved in the game of Softball. 
These known risks include the risk of being struck by the ball in 
the course of play. Rather than simply referring to the possible 
negligence of the Mr. Jones, the doctrine of assumption of risk is 
related to the consent given by him when he voluntarily 
participates in a sport. Tavernier v. Maes, 242 Cal App. 2d 532 
(1966). 
In the case of Ridge v. Kladnick, 713 P.2d 1131 (Wash. App. 
1986), the court stated that " [assumption of the risk is not a 
mere variant of comparative negligence in this case. rather, 
assumption of the risk involves a knowing encounter of a danger and 
a subjective standard of conduct." 713 P.2d at 1132, citing Prosser 
& W. Keaton, Torts § 68 at 485 (5th ed. 1984). The courts 
contrasted this to comparative negligence, or "breach of an 
objective reasonable standard of conduct." The court goes on to 
note that "this primary type of assumption of risk should continue 
to bar recovery even after the adoption of comparative negligence 
or fault because assumption of risk in this form is, in reality, 
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the principle of no duty-hence no underlying cause of action." 713 
P.2d at 1132-1133. 
In Ridge, plaintiff was injured in the course of a game of 
"Shoot the Duck/Wipe Out" at a local skating rink. Plaintiff was 
injured in the expected course of the game, and brought suit. The 
court there held that assumption of the risk was a complete bar to 
recovery, notwithstanding comparative negligence. Here, the facts 
are substantially similar. Mr. Jones was injured during the 
expected course of a softball game. Mr. Barney was acting in 
accordance with the accepted procedures for playing softball. 
Therefore, Mr. Jones' assumption of the specific risks involved in 
playing softball should act as a complete bar to recovery 
Mr. Jones has characterized the issues involved in assumption 
of risk as fault, but the doctrine can apply where a claimant is 
without fault. It is simply a recognition that certain events are 
not actionable, because the participants have either implicitly or 
explicitly consented to them. Under Mr. Jones's interpretation of 
Utah law, a quarterback in any neighborhood football or basketball 
game would be able to sue for tackles and fouls. This 
interpretation is contrary to any reasonable conception of 
voluntary sports. Admittedly, if Mr. Charles had thrown a softball 
at Mr. Jones on the street without warning, there might be a cause 
of action, there simply should not be one in this situation. 
Actions that could be considered tortious normally have been 
held not to be a tort in athletic contests. Where a softball 
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player collided with a baseman, he was held not liable for the 
baseman's injuries, because he did not act in an unexpected or 
unsportsmanlike manner, that is his conduct was within the safety 
rules of the sport. Novak v. Lamar Ins. Co., 488 So. 2d. 139 (La 
App. 2d Cir. 1986). Where a Softball player broke an opposing team 
member's ankle in a "slide", again the player was not held liable 
because his action was not prohibited by the rules, and therefore 
such conduct was within the realm of activities contemplated by a 
game of Softball. Picou v. Hartford Ins. Co. . 558 So.2d. 787 (La. 
App. 5th Cir. 1990) . When a softball player was struck in the eye 
by a softball thrown by a teammate during "warm-up" the court held 
that the player had voluntarily consented by participating in the 
injury-causing event, and the player therefore understood and 
accepted the dangers of the sport, including any carelessness. 
O'Neill v. Daniels, 522 N.E.2d. 1066 (N.Y. App., 4th Div. 1987). 
Here, Mr. Jones had participated in numerous sports 
activities. According to his testimony, Mr. Jones had played 
softball for many years, since his teens, see Exhibit "C". He must 
have realized the danger of sports injuries. In volunteering to 
participate, he assumed the risks associated with the game of 
softball. This consent is an element of participation in any 
sporting event, notwithstanding any contributory negligence or lack 
thereof on the part of the Mr. Jones. The doctrine of assumption 
of risk is not barred in this case by Utah's comparative negligence 
statute. This action should be dismissed because defendant did not 
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violate any safety rule of softball. In one case in this area, the 
court permitted suit against a competitor where the player causing 
the injury violated a safety rule in a unsportsmanlike manner. 
Nabozny v. Barnhill, 334 N.E.2d. 258 (111 1975). There, a soccer 
player injured a goalkeeper when he kicked the goalkeeper in the 
head. The player had entered the "penalty area," where any 
contact with a goalkeeper in possession of the ball is a violation 
of the game rules. In contrast, Mr. Barney was not in violation of 
the rules of softball when this incident occurred. He was not 
attempting to gain an unsportsmanlike advantage, but was attempting 
to throw the ball to his teammate. This action should be barred 
because Mr. Barney was acting in accord with the rules of softball. 
Participants in sports or amusements are taken to assume known 
risks of injury, though they are not deemed to have consented to 
unsportsmanlike rule violations. Ridge v. Kladnick, 713 P.2d 1131 
at 1133 (Wash App. 1986) ; Robilard v. P & R Racetracks, Inc.. 405 
So.2d 1203 (La.App. 1981) (stock car race driver hit disabled 
vehicle); Duffy v. Midlothian Country Club, 92 111.App.3d 193, 47 
111. Dec. 786, 415 N.E.2d. 1099 (1980) (Spectator injured at golf 
tournament); Daniel v. Cambridge Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 368 So.2d 118 
(La.App.2d Cir. 1979) (plaintiff injured while horseback riding); 
Richmond v. Employers1 Fire Ins. Co.. 298 So.2d 118 (La.App 1st 
Cir. 1974) (flying baseball bat); Moe v. Steenberg, 275 Minn. 448, 
147 N.W.2d 587 (1966) (skating injury); Duskiewicz v. Carter. 115 
Vt. 122, 52 A.2d 788 (1947). By participating in the softball 
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game, Mr. Jones agreed to accept the risks inherent in the game 
that were obvious and necessary. One of those risks was that of 
being hit with the Softball. Because Mr. Jones placed himself in 
this are of known risk, Mr. Barney does not owe a duty to him with 
regard to those risks. Kennedy v. Providence Hockey Club, Inc.. 
119 R.I. 70, 376 A.2d 329 (1977). It is inconceivable that Mr. 
Jones could withhold his consent to participate, while still 
participating, his playing softball evidences his intent to expose 
himself to these activities. 
Contrary to the interpretation given by Mr. Jones, this rule 
is not a bright-line test for dismissal or retention of a claim. 
The safety rules of a sport give an easily interpreted guide to the 
courts for determination of what types of conduct the participants 
have consented to. Therefore, in playing basketball, baseball or 
football, one consents to the types of activities normally 
associated with these sports, as set out in their accepted rules. 
To claim otherwise would be to advance the position that although 
you were voluntarily playing softball, you did not realize that 
there would be softballs being thrown from one player to the other; 
or that although you had joined a basketball league, you did not 
expect other players to attempt to block your goals. This is not 
a reasonable interpretation of sports participation. 
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POINT II: MR JONES SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED 
TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF INTENTIONAL CONDUCT 
AFTER MOVING TO DISMISS HIS CLAIM, 
Mr. Jones states in his Brief that the issue of whether Mr. 
Barney was acting deliberately, willfully or with a reckless 
disregard for the safety of Mr. Jones should be given to a trier of 
fact. However, on March 9th, 1992, Mr. Jones filed a motion to 
voluntarily dismiss his claim that Mr. Barney was acting with 
intent to injure. See Exhibit "A" Mr. Jones should not be able to 
appeal the dismissal of a claim dismissed on his motion. Further, 
there is no reasonable reading of the facts that show even 
negligence, let alone a reckless disregard of Mr. Jones's safety. 
Mr. Jones stated in his deposition that he had no reason to believe 
that Mr. Barney was acting with intent to injure, see Exhibit "C". 
Therefore, Mr. Jones cannot appeal on the grounds that the 
intentional conduct claim should be decided by a jury. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court properly granted the motion for Summary 
Judgment. Mr. Jones cannot appeal on the grounds that his claim of 
intentional conduct should have been heard by a jury, when he 
voluntarily moved to dismiss his own claim. The dismissal should 
be upheld, and this Appeal should be denied. 
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DATED THIS o W day of May, 1993, 
az~s 
J. KENT HOLLAND 
Attorney for Appellee. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellee W. Charles Barney were mailed, postage 
prepaid, to Leonard McGee, GOICOCHEA LAW OFFICE - WEST VALLEY, 
Attorneys for Appellant, The Harmon Building, 3540 South 4000 West, 




E X H I B I T "A" 
DEFENDANT' MOTION TO DISMISS 
EXHIBIT # A 
LEONARD E. McGEE - A2185 
GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICE - WEST VALLEY 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
The Harmon Building 
3540 South 4000 West, Suite 100 
West Valley City, Utah 84120 
(801)964-8228 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JONATHAN JONES, : 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
W. CHARLES BARNEY, : 
Defendant. : 
: MOTION TO DISMISS 
: Case No. 91-0904369 PI 
: Judge Homer Wilkinson 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff in the above-captioned matter and hereby 
moves the Court for an order dismissing, with prejudice, his Second 
Cause of Action for Intentional Conduct against the defendant, with all 
other causes of action remaining against the defendant. 
DATED this day of "^ .^ A,,, , 4 , 1992. 
GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICE - WEST VALLEY 
LEONARD E. McGEE 
1 
ORDFR 
COMES NOW the Court and, based upon the motion of the Plaintiff 
and with good cause appearing therefore, and having been fully advised 
in the premises; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the plaintiffs 
Second Cause of Action for Intentional Conduct is dismissed with 
prejudice, with all other causes of action remaining against the 
defendant. 
DATED this day of , 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
HOMER WILKINSON 
Third District Court Judge 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS HIS SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION AS AGAINST THE DEFENDANT 
and ORDER were mailed, vis First Class U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, to 
the following this / day of March, 1992: 
J. Kent Holland 
ANDERSON & HOLLAND 
Attorneys for the Defendant 
623 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Daniel V. Goodsell 
KIRTON, MCCONKIE & POELMAN 
Personal Attorney for the Defendant 
60 East South Temple, #1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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E X H I B I T "B" 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
EXHIBIT # 
J. KENT HOLLAND, #1520 
ANDERSON & HOLLAND 
Attorney for Defendant 
623 East First South 
P.O. Box 11643 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0643 
Telephone: (801) 363-9345 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 




W. CHARLES BARNEY, 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 910904369 PI 
Judge Homer Wilkinson 
Defendant, by and through his attorney J. Kent Holland, 
and pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
hereby moves that Plaintiff's claim be dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED THIS £ /A day of June, 1992 
VL-£? 
vent Holland 
torney for Defendant 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment was mailed, 
postage prepaid, to Leonard E. McGee, GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICE - WEST 
VALLEY, Attorney for Plaintiff, 3540 South 4000 West, Suite 100 
West Valley City, Utah 84120, and to Daniel V. Goodsell, Personal 
Attorney for the Defendant, 18 00 Eagle Gate Tower, 6( tst South 
r'& 
Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this Y da^/of June, J^992. 
£2S~ 
J. KENT HOLLAND, #1520 
ANDERSON & HOLLAND 
Attorney for Defendant 
623 East First South 
P.O. Box 11643 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0643 
Telephone: (801) 363-9345 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JONATHAN JONES, ] 
Plaintiff, 
v. ] 
W. CHARLES BARNEY, 
Defendant. ] 
| MEMORANDUM SUPPORTING | DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR | SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
i Civil No. 910904369 PI 
i Judge Homer Wilkinson 
Defendant, by and through his attorney of record, J. Kent 
Holland, and pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, hereby submits the following memorandum of points and 
authorities in support of his Motion for Summary Judgment filed in 
conjunction herewith: 
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS: 
1. Plaintiff was the first batter in an amateur L.D.S. Ward 
Softball game on or about July 11, 1990. 
2. Plaintiff hit the ball into the infield. 
3. Defendant was playing the second base position, and 
fielded the ball. 
4. Defendant threw tne ball in the direction of first base. 
5. The player at first base did not catch the ball. 




PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM IS BARRED BY 
THE DOCTRINE OF ASSUMPTION OF RISK. 
As a participant in a team athletic competition, 
Plaintiff is barred from recovering for injuries which are 
foreseeable and incidental to the competition. 77 ALR 3d. 1300. 
The assumption of risk doctrine has been recognized in Utah. 
Harrop v. Beckman, 387 P.2d 554 (Utah 1963), Mikkelsen v. Haslam, 
764 P.2d 1384 (Utah 1988). The doctrine of assumption of risk has 
been distinguished from contributory, or comparative negligence, in 
that contributory negligence is a failure to foresee a reasonable 
danger, and assumption of risk involves the plaintiff knowingly 
exposing himself to a danger. Moore v. Burton, 631 P.2d 865 (Utah 
1981) Plaintiff's injury was caused by his being struck by the 
softball in the course of normal play. Since the danger of being 
struck by the ball is an obviously foreseeable element of the game 
of softball, Plaintiff can not recover. The Plaintiff in this 
action knew the risk of being hit by the ball during the course of 
play. In the absence of either an "unsportsmanlike violation" of 
the established safety rules of the sport or intent to harm the 
other participant, courts have not held athletic participants 
liable for injuries. Bouraue v. Duplechin, 331 So. 2d. 40 (La App. 
1976) cert den. 334 So. 2d. 210 (La. 1976) , Naboznv v. Bamhill, 
334 N.E.2d. 258 (111. App. 1975). Here, Defendant has not violated 
any safety rule, nor did he intend to injure Plaintiff. Plaintiff 
cannot recover against Defendant on the basis of an athletic 
injury. 
In Utah, the courts have held that a participant in a 
sport voluntarily assumes the risks of a sport of which the 
participant has knowledge. Mikkelsen v. Haslam, 764 P.2d. 1384 
(Utah 1988). In the case of OfNeil v. Daniels, 523 N.Y.S.2d. 264 
(1987, 4th Dept) app den. 522 N.E.2d. 768, a New York court held 
that a plaintiff could not maintain an action for an injury to his 
eye by a Softball during !,warm-up"activities, because the 
plaintiff, as a player, understood and accepted the dangers of the 
sport. In Gaspard v. Grain Dealers Mutual Ins. Co.,131 So. 2d. 831 
(La.App. 1961) , a baseball player struck in the head by a bat that 
slipped out of the hands of another player was denied recovery 
because the player was shown to be aware of the danger of flying 
balls and bats. Softball and baseball players, struck by other 
players, have been denied recovery because the danger of collision 
is a recognized risk of the sport. Tavernier v. Maes. 242 Cal. 
App. 2d 532 (1966). 
In this case, Plaintiff was a voluntary participant in a 
game of softball. The danger of being hit by the ball during the 
course of play is a recognized risk of the sport. Provisions are 
made in the rules of slow pitch softball. Plaintiff either knew or 
should have known the danger of being hit by the ball. 
Point II: 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM IS BARRED BECAUSE 
DEFENDANT INTENDED NO INJURY. 
This action should be dismissed because the injury was 
not inflicted intentionally. Some courts have held that an injury 
inflicted in the course of an athletic competition can be 
maintained if a participant intentionally injures an opponent. 
Bouroue v. Duplechin. 331 So. 2d. 40 (La App. 1976) , Griggs v. 
Clauson, 128 N.E.2d. 363 (111 1955). In Bourque, a baserunner in 
a softball game was held liable for deliberately running into a 
baseman, where the runner hit the baseman under the chin attempting 
to block his view of first base and stop a double play. In Griggs, 
a basketball player struck an opponent in the face with his fist in 
an attempt to gain possession of the ball. Here, Defendant did not 
attempt to injure his opponent but is only alleged to have been 
negligent. Plaintiff admitted in his deposition that he did not 
believe the injury was intentional. Plaintiff did not observe the 
actual throwing of the ball. Defendant was attempting to complete 
a legal play, as opposed to the cases where liability was allowed. 
In these cases, liability was allowed because the offending player 
assaulted a competitor in an intention manner. The defendants in 
these cases were behaving outside of the rules of the sports and 
were attempting to disable their competitors, not complete legal 
plays. 
POINT III: 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM IS BARRED BECAUSE 
DEFENDANT DID NOT VIOLATE ANY SAFETY RULE. 
This action should be dismissed because the defendant did 
not violate any safety rule of softball. In one case in this area, 
the court permitted suit against a competitor where the player 
causing the injury violated a safety rule in a unsportsmanlike 
manner. Naboznv v. Barnhill. 334 N.E.2d. 258 (111 1975). There, a 
soccer player injured a goalkeeper when he kicked the goalkeeper in 
the head. The player had entered the "penalty area," where any 
contact with a goalkeeper in possession of the ball is a violation 
of the game rules. In contrast, Defendant was not in violation of 
the rules of Softball when this incident occurred. He was not 
attempting to gain an unsportsmanlike advantage, but was attempting 
to throw the ball to his teammate. This action should be barred 
because Defendant was acting in accord with the rules of softball. 
CONCLUSION 
This suit should be dismissed because the Plaintiff 
assumed the risk of this injury. The risk of being hit by the ball 
during the course of the game was foreseeable, known to the 
players, and part of the course of play. The Defendant did not act 
with an intent to injure the plaintiff. The injury was not caused 
by a violation any of the rules of the sport. The Defendant cannot 
be held liable for this injury because of the doctrine of 
assumption of risk. 
DATED THIS 4th day of June, 1992. 
J. KENT HOLLAND 
Attorney for Defendant 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment was mailed, postage prepaid, to Leonard E. 
McGee, GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICE - WEST VALLEY, Attorney for Plaintiff, 
3540 South 4000 West, Suite 100 West Valley City, Utah 84120, and 
to Daniel V. Goodsell, Personal Attorney for the Defendant, 1800 
Eagle Gate Tower, 60 East South Temple, Salt Lake City,_Utah 84111, 
this */ day of June, 1992.
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E X H I B I T "C" 
SELECTED DEPOSITION TESTIMONY 
( B y Mr . H o l l a n d ) EXHIBIT # 
1 1 
C 
1 Community College? 
2 A. Correct. 
3 Q. Were you involved in any sports in high 
4 school at Tyler? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. What did you do there? 
7 A. I ran track. I played football and 
8 basketball. 
9 Q. And did you letter in those sports? 
10 A. I did, yes. 
11 Q. Any other sports after high school? 
12 A. Yes. I was trying out for the Salt Lake 
13 Community College basketball team and I did play in 
14 several county rec leagues. 
15 Q. What kind of county rec leagues? 
16 Basketball? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. Did you play any county rec softball 
19 leagues? 
20 A. No, not softball. Just church softball. 
21 Q. How long have you played church softball? 
22 A. Since I was a Deacon. Twelve years old. 
23 Q. You are dealing with a gentile here, so 
24 you are not going to -- you have to give me ages. 
25 A. That !s fine. 
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(By Mr. Holland) 
1 Q. And did you play continuously during that 
2 period of time? 
3 A. I did, yes. 
4 Q. Did you ever suffer any injuries of any 
5 kind during your athletics prior to the incident 
6 here of July of f90? 
7 A. I did. 
8 Q. What type of injuries did you sustain? 
9 A. Senior year in football, I had a broken 
10 collar bone. 
11 I Q. Any others? 
12 A. No. 
13 Q. Did you play base ball in high school, I 
14 believe you said? 
15 A. No. 
16 Q. You did not play base ball? 
17 A. No. 
18 Q. Did you play little league? 
19 A. I — yes. 
20 Q. Did you play Pony League, or Babe Ruth, or 
21 any of those? 
22 A. Where I went, it was Pee-Wee League, Minor 
23 League, and Major League. And I played through the 
24 major leagues. 
25 Q. How old does major league go up to, 14? 
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A. I was 11 when I played. I went straight 
from Pee-Wee to Major. So my last year was 11 years 
old. 
Q. And during those periods of time, did you 
ever get hit by the base ball? 
A. Never. 
Q. The church al1-softball , is that 
all-softball? 
A. It's all-softball. 
Q. Is it all slow-pitch? 
A. All slow-pitch. 
Q. And were you ever hit with the ball at all 
that you can recall? 
A. Never. 
Q. You are lucky. I have been hit a couple 
of times. I must be too slow to move out the way. 
Q. I'm going to call your attention to the 
day of this incident, which I believe is July 11th, 
1990. Is that the correct date, as you recall it? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Do you remember what day of the week it 
was? 
A. It was a Wednesday, I believe. 
Q. Was it? 
A. A Wednesday or Thursday. 
Rockie Dustin * Capitol Reporters 
37 


























Q. What else? 
A. A moneymonger. 
Q. Did you ever say something to Charles 
about whether he intentionally threw the ball or 
not? 
A. Never• 
Q. You never said that you knew he did not 
throw it intentionally at you? 
A. I do remember saying something like that. 




I don't think it was -- I don't know. 
Has anyone ever told you that he 
intentionally threw the ball at you? 
A. Nobody has ever said anything like that. 
Q. Are you aware, in your second cause of 
action, that you claim that he threw it at you? 
A. I never claimed that he intentionally 
threw the ball at me. 
Q. You've never read your complaint? 
A. Excuse me? 
Q. Did you ever read the complaint that your 
lawyer filed on your behalf? 
MR. McGEE: I think we sent it to you. 
THE WITNESS: I don't recall. I'm sorry. 
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